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*WAR AND POST-TRUTH: MORAL EQUALITY OF COMBATANTS
AND INCULPABLE IGNORANCE IN JUST WAR THEORY*

SUMMARY: This paper aims to explain the effect of the post-truth on revisionism in Just War Theory. Revisionism in JWT is based on the claim that Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello cannot be separated and that only combatants who fight on the just side are morally justified in killing. Presupposition of this argument is that combatants can and ought to know the moral status of their side. This paper will demonstrate that it is impossible to demand combatants to know whether their side is just by investigating the implications of post-truth in modern conflicts. By demonstrating the practical impossibility of combatants to know whether their side is just, author will show that the assumption of inculpable ignorance in war must remain the essence of JWT. Post-truth phenomenon only fortifies the necessity of separating Jus ad Bellum from Jus in Bello and upholding the principle of moral equality of combatants in contemporary wars.

KEY WORDS: War, Post-Truth, Inculpable Ignorance, Moral Equality, Just War Theory

1. Introduction – Notion of Post-truth

“Handle them carefully, for words have more power than atom bombs”
Pearl Strachan Hurd

The words we chose to use when describing reality have immense power, power so great that they can even shape reality itself. One cannot overstate the importance of knowing what words we use actually mean and what key notions denote. Therefore, it is crucial to define the content of notions we use in our arguments, in order to grasp their scope and understand which phenomena in reality actually fall in the said scope. Clarification of notions is not only the essential task of philosophy, but also a *condictio sine qua non* of all constructive and meaningful arguments. The notion of post-truth is rather new, albeit the phenomenon it reflects may not be, and demands clarification. Notion of war, contrastingly, is all too familiar to all of us. In order to optimally understand the

relationship between post-truth and war, or better yet, implications of post-truth phenomenon on war and its particular dimensions today, we must first attempt to define and explain the notion of post-truth to preclude any possible confusion¹.

1.1. Post-truth

There are not many phenomena that provoked so much public interest or had so many deep implications on pretty much every sphere of society as much as the phenomenon of post-truth. So much so that it was “canonized when *Oxford Dictionary* chose it as the word of the year” (Blackburn 2018: 5) in 2016, recognizing the need for a new notion that would adequately reflect the newly created reality. This new reality is best depicted by the fact that the term “post-truth” saw a “2000 percent spike in usage over 2015” (McIntyre 2018: 1) which made it an obvious choice for the word of the year². The said renowned dictionary defined post-truth as an adjective “relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief”. Direct cause for this upsurge of usage of the notion of post-truth were two political campaigns which culminated in 2016 in United States of America and in Great Britain; namely, Donald Trump’s presidential campaign and the campaign for Britain exiting the EU spearheaded by Boris Johnson. The created, rather Orwellian, narrative that assumes the existence of “alternative facts”³ and considers truth to perhaps only be important “for little people and losers, not for the movers and shakers of the world” (Blackburn 2018: 6) eventually led many to conclude that “there’s no such thing, unfortunately, anymore as facts” (McIntyre 2018: 2).

But, despite the fact that we only officially introduced the term post-truth in 2016, it is by no means a completely new phenomenon⁴. Most authors agree that the very phenomenon of post-truth “has deep roots that go back thousands of years, to the evo-

1 For the purpose of this paper, our assumption must be that we, as humankind, are all unfortunately very much familiar with the meaning of the notion of war. But even this can be argued in the light of modern-day difficulties we encounter when attempting to differentiate war from other forms of political violence, such are terrorism, insurgency, etc. More on implications of deliberately created conceptual confusion regarding the meaning and scope of the notion of war in (Kashnikov 2016: 31-47; Babić 2017: 159-212).

2 Interestingly, another illustrious dictionary of English language, namely the *Collins Dictionary*, chose “fake news” as its word of the year only one year later, i.e., in 2017.

3 This idea was introduced by Trump’s counselor Conway, describing the view on the number of people attending Trump’s inauguration (Blackburn 2018: 5).

4 It is not even a completely new word syntagm! It was first used by a Serbian-American playwright Steve Tesich in 1992, and it was also later used by some authors like Ralph Keyes, David Roberts, etc. (d’Ancona 2017: 3-4).

lution of cognitive irrationalities” (McIntyre 2018: 14) and that the modern-day momentous impact of post-truth on practical reality was foreseen by many thinkers of the XX century, most prominently Hannah Arendt and George Orwell (Brahms 2020). We, as human beings, are simply hard-wired with a plethora of cognitive biases⁵ which make knowing the objective truth so extremely difficult. Especially if we are in any way emotionally involved in the matter being judged, as our brains are “infected with motivated reasoning... and biased evaluation” making us incredibly “vulnerable to cognitive biases and fallacies” (Pinker 2018: 359, 403). We cannot but recall Bacon’s ingenious identification of four “idols of mind”⁶ which prevent us from objectively observing the world – a discovery he made already in the beginning of the XVII century and which still represents a truism. But, why have we as humanity only now been hit so hard with this post-truth phenomenon? It seems that our inherent biases and flaws, along with technological breakthroughs and our dominant global ideological presuppositions created a perfect post-truth storm⁷ which makes it impossible for ordinary people to know the “real truth” even if we put all of our efforts into this pursuit of truth. This perfect storm and the so-called “crisis of truth” today profoundly impacts almost all segments and spheres of life, especially those most important in which we heavily invest our emotions, interests, and beliefs. “Real truths” on the most important things in societies have become unknowable for ordinary people. There are few, if any, phenomena more complex, demanding, taxing, ambivalent, and essentially important to all of humanity than war. Therefore, it is of paramount importance to determine the implications of post-truth on various aspects of war, particularly its moral dimension.

2. Post-Truth and Just War Theory

“The first victim of war is truth”
Hiram Warren Johnson

The relationship between truth and war is best described by the popular saying “the first victim of war is truth”. On the other hand, truth is absolutely central for all phi-

5 McIntyre offers a lengthy list of our proven and well-documented inherent biases (McIntyre 2018: 35-62).

6 In *Novum Organum*, one of the pillars of modern science and reasoning, Francis Bacon identified four “Idols of the Mind” – Idols of the Tribe, Idols of the Cave, Idols of the Marketplace, and Idols of the Theater. In today’s terms, these would be called fallacies or cognitive biases, meaning that we have known of these processes for over four centuries!

7 Brahms recognizes the convergence of four key characteristics of post-truth today – “information explosion and disruptive technology; the dwindling of faith in institutions...; post-modernist ideas...; and the bitter political battles over the criteria of truth” (Brahms 2020: 16).

osophy, especially ethics. Ethics of war deals with the infinitely morally complex landscape of war trying to make sense of many unique practices and events which are inherent and endemic to a phenomenon which is “often assumed to be the most ruthlessly amoral of all human activities” (Schulte 2012: 100). Obviously, determining what is right and wrong, justified and unjustified, in such an activity cannot be unaffected by the described phenomenon of post-truth because without truth there is ethics. One key segment of ethics of war which is profoundly influenced by post-truth is the issue of moral equality of combatants in Just War Theory (JWT).

2.1. Just War Theory and Moral Equality of Combatants

JWT is not the only ethical perspective of war, but it is the most relevant and most elaborated one. It represents a bold synthesis and a “pragmatic compromise” (Whetnam 2011: 68) between two opposite and logically inconsistent extremes – pacifism and so-called “realism”. Modern JWT is a product of centuries of critical moral thinking and a wide spectrum of arguments concerning every possible aspect of war – potential justness of war as a phenomenon, justification of a specific war, moral duty to go or to reject to go to war, moral responsibility for killing in war, moral responsibility for declaring war, moral aspects of peace treaties which end war, etc. In its most robust and comprehensive form, modern JWT consists of four distinct elements – *Jus ante Bellum*, *Jus ad Bellum*, *Jus in Bello*, and *Jus post Bellum*⁸. Each of these elements addresses a specific segment or period of war – from preparation for war (*Jus ante Bellum*), across entering war (*Jus ad Bellum*) and waging war (*Jus in Bello*) to ending war (*Jus post Bellum*). *Jus ad Bellum* and *Jus in Bello* are the most important and most historically founded elements of JWT, and are usually referred to as the “classic core” of JWT⁹. One of the cornerstones of JWT is that moral judgments about justice of war must be “logically independent” from moral judgments about justice in war. This “dualism of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* is at the heart of all that is most problematic in the moral reality of war” (Walzer 2006: 21). Such necessary logical separation allows the possibility of just wars to be fought unjustly and *vice versa*, meaning that combatants in war can only be judged for what they actually do in war, regardless of the “justness” of their side¹⁰. In effect, this entails moral equality of combatants in war

8 An in-depth and detailed insights into JWT, its elements, and their mutual relations in (Станар 2019).

9 The two remaining elements were added to JWT in the previous decades and are still in their “theoretical infancy”.

10 Combatants in war on both sides can remain “morally clean” as long as their actions in war are in accordance with the rules of war; *vice versa*, combatants on both sides can be war criminals depending on what they do in war, even if their war is just.

and allows basic common-sense morality to be used in war¹¹ making “all combatants *prima facie* equal” (Babić 2017: 181). This presupposition, that combatants on both sides have the right to kill those who are threatening their lives in war and that all combatants are liable to be killed by their enemies because they pose a mortal threat, has been an integral part of JWT since the beginning of the XVI century. But revisionism in JWT which emerged in recent years brought this presupposition into question by introducing the idea of moral asymmetry of combatants in war.

Post-modern era of humanity created a perfect breeding ground for revisionism in all imaginable shapes and forms – basic facts and assertions of all institutions, practices, and sciences are being scrutinized and reevaluated. Ethics as such, and JWT as a part of it, was certainly no exception to the rule and trend of revisionism. One of the bedrocks of JWT revisionism is disputing the necessary logical separation of *Jus ad Bellum* from *Jus in Bello* and thus also the assumption of moral equality of combatants¹². According to revisionists, we must use the so-called “domestic analogy” in war, meaning that we cannot have different standards of moral judgment depending on the state we are in (war or peace). Following the domestic analogy, only combatants of the just side, i.e., those who fight against a “wrongful threat”, have the right to kill their enemies, while those who are on the unjust side not only have no such right, but also “have no right of defense” (McMahan 2009: 14) against mortal threats to their lives and lives of their non-combatant compatriots. From the perspective of revisionists, those who fight on the unjust side have no right of killing in self-defense against lethal attacks of their enemies, meaning that everything they do in self-defense constitutes a war crime as their enemies did nothing to “make themselves morally liable to defensive attack” (McMahan 2009: 14). Revisionists’ understanding of war, and the moral asymmetry of combatants that follows from it, not only introduces logically and ethically repugnant implications¹³, but it also negates the very possibility of war as we know it, transforming every armed conflict into a “police action of the

11 Moral equality of combatants in war means that all combatants have equal right to kill their enemies, as long as they do it in accordance with the rules of war. They are also all eligible to be killed by their enemies, of course. There is an abundance of powerful arguments corroborating this thesis and explaining why combatants cannot be held responsible for the war they are fighting in (Stanar 2019: 229-230).

12 Revisionists’ arguments against moral symmetry of combatants in war are best elaborated by McMahan and Rodin (McMahan 2004: 693-733; McMahan 2009; McMahan 2013: 13-22; Rodin 2013: 44-68).

13 Manichean perspective of war, criminalization of enemies, elimination of rational prospects of surrender, elimination of meaningful restraint for the “just” side, introduction of the state of perpetual war, negation of the principle of discrimination and proportionality, corruption of the principles of double effect and supreme emergency are just some among many implications (Stanar 2019: 173-200).

righteous global police against the rightless criminals/terrorists” (Stonar 2019: 236). In such conflicts, following police logic, one side may do and use whatever is necessary for victory, while the other side has a moral duty to immediately surrender and obey, in addition to not having a theoretical possibility for victory in the first place (Kashnikov 2016: 31-47)! We shall not go further in the overall issue of revisionism of JWT, but instead focus on one of the pivotal presumptions of revisionists – that “all combatants must know, or at least that all combatants CAN know, whether their side is just” (Stonar 2019: 231) from which follows that they can be held morally responsible simply for fighting on the unjust side.

2.2. JWT and Inculpable Ignorance

Both the traditionalists and revisionists of JWT agree that in all wars all belligerents believe not only that they are the exclusively just side in the conflict, but also that “their own victory is... of great importance to mankind” (Russell 1915: 130), not only their nation. This is of course expected as it is derived from the very nature of war – “If combatants agreed with respect to which party had justice on their side, they would not need to have recourse to war... war begins where moral consensus ends” (Rodin 2013: 59). It would be rather foolish to presume that normal ordinary people would take part in such a morally disturbing activity as killing other people if they didn’t deeply believe that they are doing it for a just cause. War is too morally expensive of a phenomenon for a person’s involvement in it to be explained simply by *akrasia*. But what happens if their beliefs are wrong, if they are in fact ignorant¹⁴ of the justness of their side? Classical JWT perspective resides on the vital presupposition of *inculpable ignorance* of all combatants in war¹⁵ – those who fight in wars merely *believe* but do not *know* whether their side is just or not. More importantly, they *objectively cannot know*, even if they genuinely do their best to find out. Revisionists’ argument is opposite, i.e., that combatants *can* and thus *ought* to know whether they are fighting on the just or unjust side, meaning that even if there is ignorance it is culpable ignorance. Some even argue that it is sufficient for one to have doubts about justness of his side in order to become morally responsible for remaining a combatant, because statistically “most soldiers in the history of war have fought in the service of an unjust cause” (McMahan 2004: 701). Thus, one is morally obliged to immediately surrender due to doubt, as “our negative duty not to kill is in general stronger than our positive duty to prevent people from being killed” (McMahan 2013: 16). From a revisionist standpoint, there is no inculpable ignorance in war as combatants can know or at least can and

14 Honestly believing in something does not constitute knowledge and thus does not negate ignorance – “a belief does not count as knowledge unless its true” (Hart 2009: 321).

15 This has been a staple in JWT ever since Vitoria’s argumentation for “invincible ignorance” in war, meaning from the School of Salamanca or the XV century.

ought to doubt. If revisionists were to concede that there is such a thing as inculpable ignorance in war, there would no longer be any logical foundation for their arguments for moral asymmetry of combatants.

The idea of inculpable ignorance is an extremely interesting one, especially in the context of moral responsibility in war. The very notion comes from Catholic theology, where inculpable or “invincible” ignorance was introduced to explain how one can be absolved or excused from sin if he sinned in ignorance. But not all ignorance absolves from sin – if someone is ignorant of things he could and ought to know, his ignorance is a product of negligence and thus it cannot excuse his actions. If, on the other hand, a person “fails to know what he is unable to know” such ignorance is called “‘invincible’ because it cannot be overcome by study” and therefore “no invincible ignorance is a sin” (Aquinas 2020: 1247). As expected, ethical perspective is very similar, almost identical – a person is not morally responsible, i.e., he is morally inculpable if he acts out of ignorance which is invincible, meaning that for him the truth was unknowable. If he was willfully ignorant, meaning that he didn’t bother to know a knowable truth then he is, of course, morally culpable. Therefore, ignorance is culpable and cannot be an excuse “if and only if it springs from negligence - from want of due care” (Donagan 1979: 130), i.e., when facts could and ought to have been known – following the Ought-Implies-Can principle (OIC)¹⁶. In the context of our argument – combatants can be morally responsible for fighting for an unjust side if and only if their ignorance of their side’s justice is a product of their negligence and lack of due care.

We argue that ignorance of virtually all combatants in all wars in human history is not a product of their negligence or lack of care, but rather of their objective inability to know the unknowable *truth* about which side is just and which is unjust. Therefore, all combatants are *prima facie* morally equal as they are all inculpably ignorant of the truth regarding justice of their war. Nevertheless, they cannot in principle be inculpably ignorant about what they should and should not themselves do in war – it is almost impossible¹⁷ to argue that killing non-combatants, raping women, executing war prisoners, etc. could be done out of inculpable ignorance, especially today. There are countless reasons why we cannot reasonably expect combatants to know whether they are fighting for the just or unjust side and many of them are today additionally reinforced by the post-truth phenomenon.

16 Even though OIC was discussed by many philosophers, “Kant is often regarded as the founding father of the principle”, and it is sometimes referred to as “Kant’s dictum” or “Kant’s law” (Kohl 2015: 690-710). In legal context, this principle that no one can have an obligation to do the impossible has been present for millennia, in different iterations – *Impossibilium nulla obligatio est*, *Ad impossibilia nemo tenetur*, *Ultra posse nemo tenetur*, etc.

17 There is a slight chance that, in rare instances, combatants can be inculpably ignorant but only of the fact whether their disregard for the *in Bello* principle of discrimination (selectivity) can be justified as collateral damage, i.e., justified by the doctrine of double effect.

2.3. Post-truth and Inculpable Ignorance

If we would to observe the world before the influx of all factors which led to the necessity of introducing the notion post-truth in our minds and languages, we would see that inculpable ignorance of combatants in war was uncontroversial, to say the least. The very nature of armed forces, especially in times of war was, and still is, such that it deliberately “epistemically limits” its members – not only would they be cut off from any uncensored information in order to prevent enemy subversive propaganda activities, they would also be “actively discouraged¹⁸ from engaging in discussion and disagreement about the meaning of events” (Wolfendale 2015: 91). As even prominent revisionists acknowledge, every attempt of “autonomous reflection and deliberation about the content of... orders is also deliberately and systematically sabotaged” (McMahan 2009: 119) by the very military institution. At the same time, combatants are constantly bombarded with propaganda machineries of their own side which often focuses on the “unjustness” and “evilness” of their enemies. Even if their side is unjust, it will always attempt to deceive its population, as deception always reaches its pinnacle in “states of great uncertainty... when community faces danger... especially external” (Čupić 1990: 65-66) and when mobilization of all resources is essential for survival. We must also take into account the we, as human beings, are extraordinarily prone to self-deception, “especially... when considering war”¹⁹. In his seminal work, *The Folly of Fools*, one of the most important books on the phenomena of self-deception, Robert Trivers devoted an entire chapter to war, explaining how “processes of self-deception make an unusually large contribution to warfare”, especially regarding the issue of our side’s “degree of morality” (Trivers 2011: 247). But these, along with many other, arguments can only mitigate guilt if one *can* actually know whether his side is just or unjust. The main argument for inculpable ignorance was that those who fought wars had no reasonable way of getting to *any* reliable information which would enable them to reach conclusions with any degree of accuracy or reliability. Admittedly, things have changed. Drastically.

Technological and civilizational advances, some would say leaps and bounds, in past decades have made dissemination of information almost effortless and limitless. Can this fact be the final nail in the coffin of inculpable ignorance of combatants thesis? We argue that the post-truth phenomenon proves that this in fact cannot be the proverbial final nail under the hammer of revisionists. To be knowledgeable, educated or informed once meant to have practical access to information. Today it is no longer the case – today, to be knowledgeable and informed means to be able to critically

18 This syntagm is used in an extremely euphemistic manner, as all those who were in uniform very well know.

19 Impact of our cognitive biases on our judgment of war is particularly significant (Werner 2013: 35-46).

examine an infinite amount of information which we all have literally at our fingertips, and then decide which information is true and which is false. Post-truth phenomenon reveals that ignorance can in fact be a result of not only the lack of information but also of an uncontrolled flood of conflicting information. In post-truth, the goal is not to censor unwanted information, but to “inundate the media with information to drown out oppositional voices, create a cacophony overwhelming the audience, and sow doubt” (Tas 2021: 170). It seems that the biggest floods of information come precisely in times of war, making the task of “clarifying reality and clearing away the fog of war” (Brun, Roitman 2020: 11) virtually impossible for all, ordinary people, i.e., combatants in particular, who remain ignorant of the true justice of war²⁰.

Due to the well-known “mechanisms” of post-truth – fake news, echo chambers, filter bubbles, AI bots, AI algorithms which tailor the information we individually receive based on our preexisting beliefs and weaknesses, and many more – ignorance of combatants in modern wars must be treated as inculpable ignorance. The battle for exclusivity of “our truth” in the “cognitive realm” is no less ferocious than battles on the “kinetic battlespaces” (Brun, Roitman 2020: 12). All the aforementioned mechanisms rely heavily on our inherent biological biases “making us ripe for manipulation and exploitation by those who have an agenda to push” (McIntyre 2018: 62), and there is no agenda more crucially important and emotionally magnetizing than war. As these mechanisms make it *impossible* for combatants to *know* what the truth is regarding the justness of their side, it is impossible to demand that they *ought to* know and then, based on this demand, assign guilt and responsibility simply for participating in an unjust war. No combatant *can* know whether they are fighting on the unjust or just side, and thus there must not be any form of moral asymmetry based solely on the justness of a side in war. A person can only be morally required to do something if he in fact can do it – in our context, a combatant can only be morally required to *know* if his side is just or unjust if he in fact *can* know this. As Frankena pointed out almost a century ago, the fact that a person cannot in reality do something “has led many moral philosophers to say, in one way or another, that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’” (Frankena 1950: 157). Following the Ought-Implies-Can argument in this case²¹ - if we

20 Thinking of wars in past two decades, we cannot but remember the influx of contradictory information which flooded the public – Iraq’s WMD, Al Qaeda’s safehouses in Afghanistan, Syrian humanitarian crisis, etc. – and which practically disabled the public’s ability to *know the truth* (Keenan 2017: 190-213).

21 OIC principle is perhaps a rather controversial one, given the fact that in some cases, ought does not necessarily imply/entail/presupposes can. As Mizrahi noted, “opponents of OIC offer a variety of counterexamples in an attempt to show that there are cases in which an agent ought to perform a certain action even though she cannot perform the action” (Mizrahi 2009: 19-35). But, in the context of our argument that one must be able to know something in order for him to be obliged to know it, OIC principle cannot be reasonably disputed.

accept that combatants *cannot* know whether their side is just (the last decade marvelously proved in practice that post-truth phenomenon makes this impossible) but still insist that they *ought* to know and from that assert that their ignorance as culpable, then we are in truth making a logical error.

3. Conclusion

“Theirs not to make reply, Theirs not to reason why, Theirs but to do and die”
Lord Alfred Tennyson, *The Charge of the Light Brigade*

Tremendous technological progress which occurred in previous decades made dissemination of information and our access to knowledge and truth all but effortless, without a historical parallel. But simultaneously, the same technology enabled an uncontrolled information explosion which ushered us in the age of post-truth. Our quest for truth is no longer impossible due to our inability to get relevant information, but due to the fact that we cannot make out the “right truth” in the multiverse of competing versions of truth. As post-truth mechanisms made it impossible for ordinary individuals to know the “right truth”, especially regarding the most significant, ambivalent, and complex phenomena in modern societies which are inherently tied with political decision-making, such as war, they remain ignorant of it. Their ignorance is made inculpable by the fact that they objectively cannot know the truth even if they did everything they could have done to know it – there is simply no realistic alternative for their ignorance²². In the context of war and JWT, post-truth phenomenon actually reinforces the classical assertion of moral equality of combatants in war, as all those who fight in modern wars are inculpably ignorant of the moral status of their side in war. Combatants *cannot know* whether they are fighting for the just or unjust side, and because of that no one can demand of them that they *ought* to know. We can only assign moral responsibility and guilt to those who violate the *Jus in Bello* rules of war, regardless of the side they fight for, never for simply fighting in war. Therefore, instead of discriminating combatants on the basis of the justness of their side, “it is more appropriate to classify combatants on all sides of a conflict simply as victims” (Zupan 2008: 220)²³. Victims not only of those who make decisions to unjustly go to war, but also victims of the post-truth phenomenon.

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22 We can even invoke the famous Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) as an argument against moral asymmetry of combatants.

23 Dan Zupan, ‘A Presumption of Moral Equality of Combatants: A Citizen-Soldier’s Perspective’ in David Rodin and Henry Shue (ed.) *Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 220.

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**Rat i post-istina: moralna jednakost boraca i „neskrivljeno neznanje“
u teoriji pravednog rata
(Apstrakt)**

Cilj autora u ovom članku je da objasni uticaj fenomena post-istine na revizionizam u teoriji pravednog rata. Revizionizam u teoriji pravednog rata zasnovan je na tvrdnji da se suđenje o *Jus in Bello*-u ne može razdvajati od suđenja o *Jus ad Bellum*-u, te da samo ono ubijanje koje vrše borci koji se bore na pravednoj strani može biti opravdano. Pretpostavka ove tvrdnje je da svi borci mogu i treba da znaju moralni status njihove strane u ratu. Ovaj članak pokazuje da je nemoguće zahtevati od boraca da znaju da li je njihova strana pravedna ili ne razmatrajući implikacije fenomena post-istine na savremene konflikte. Dokazujući praktičnu nemogućnost znanja boraca o pravednosti njihove strane u ratu, autor će pokazati da pretpostavka „neskrivljenog neznanja“ o ratu mora ostati u suštini teorije pravednog rata. Fenomen post-istine samo dodatno osnažuje neophodnost razdvajanja suđenja o *Jus ad Bellum*-u od suđenja o *Jus in Bello*-u i održavanja principa moralne jednakosti boraca u savremenim ratovima.

KLJUČNE REČI: rat, post-istina, neskrivljeno neznanje, moralna jednakost, teorija pravednog rata