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INTELLECTUAL SHORTAGE AND THE CRISIS OF THE CAPITALIST WORLD-SYSTEM*

Summary

In the ‘problematization’ that I am proposing to your attention, the concept of ‘intellectual shortage’ is to designate a thinking (measured by key evaluations and governing decisions) that is under the level and/or the capacities of the science of the contemporary era. ‘Lie’, which the unforgettable Bernard Muntian defined as the global problem No. 1 in the survival of the species of *Homo sapiens*, is, in this context, a private case of deliberate and malicious production of intellectual shortage. I will use an example. The ‘double standards’ in the international politics of nowadays contain deliberate deception but – in the mass cases – they become acceptable to the public opinion in the developed countries because they correspond to a traditional and increasingly less adequate West-centric perception of the world. To get out of the illusory situation, one must expand the limits of imagination and of understanding, i.e. overcome a certain intellectual shortage.

Key words: intellectual shortage, capitalism, democracy, globalization, public opinion, international politics

1. THE PHENOMENA OF INTELLECTUAL SHORTAGE

1914. The beginning of World War II is met with a good dose of levity, inherited from *La belle époque*, with euphoria and patriotic

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pathos by the main participants Germany and Austro-Hungary, France and Russia. Both coalitions expect a quick victory. In Saint Petersburg, the French ambassador takes a bet with his English colleague Buchanan that the war is to continue until Christmas. Buchanan, being a 'pessimist', surmises that it could linger until the Easter of 1915. In Germany, the following opinion is widespread: 'Within the next two months, we will do away with France, then turn to the East, do away with the troops of the Tsar, and in three to four months at the most we will give Europe a stable peace'.¹⁾ Four years later, the European atmosphere is dense with dark despondency. One may ask: could nobody have foreseen what was going to happen?!

Almost three decades before the shots in Sarajevo, a book appeared in whose introduction we read the following:

'[T]he only war left for Prussia-Germany to wage will be a world war, a world war, moreover of an extent the violence hitherto unimagined. Eight to ten million soldiers will be at each other's throats [...]. The depredations of the Thirty Years' War compressed into three to four years and extended over the entire continent; famine, disease, the universal lapse into barbarism, both of the armies and the people, [...] collapse of the old states and their conventional political wisdom to the point where crowns will roll into the gutters by the dozen, and no one will be around to pick them up; the absolute impossibility of foreseeing how it will all end and who will emerge as victor from the battle. Only one consequence is absolutely certain: universal exhaustion and the creation of the conditions for the ultimate victory of the working class.'²⁾

The author's name is Friedrich Engels. It is worth to note a key particularity: his vision is simultaneously military, political, social, and economical. It can be said that this is a *sociological* vision, as far as sociology is the science of society as a whole. The vision of the headquarters and of politicians in the countries at war is abstract in the dialectical sense.

1919. The war ends. Marshal Foch, hearing of the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, says: 'This is not a peace treaty. It is a 20 years'

1) Such are the plans of the German headquarters. Speaks Ottokar Czernin, the last Foreign Minister of Austro-Hungary: 'The German military plan was to overrun France and then make a furious onslaught on Russia.' (Czernin 1919: 15) German social democrats were convinced of the realism of these plans, as is seen from their official opinion quoted here (as quoted in Trotsky 1991).

2) Engels 1962 [1990, p. 451]. The introduction is from 1887.

truce.’ This prognosis comes out as amazingly true as the vision of Engels. Exactly 20 years later, in 1939, the next war began.

Here is Winston Churchill’s comment on the treaty of Versailles: ‘The economic clauses of the treaty were malignant and silly to an extent that made them obviously futile.’ (Churchill 1948: 6).

1939. The eve of the new war. A key date, although little pointed at, is 19 May 1939 when the British Parliament considers Russia’s proposal for an agreement that would be restraining to Germany. Three MPs support it: Lloyd George, Anthony Eden and Winston Churchill.

‘I have been quite unable to understand what is the objection to making the agreement with Russia which the Prime Minister professes himself desirous of doing [...]. Undoubtedly, the proposals put forward by the Russian Government contemplate a Triple Alliance between England, France and Russia [...].’ (Churchill 1948: 355)

Eventually such an alliance did take place but it was forced by the circumstances at the price of enormous human victims and suffering. The basis of rejecting it in 1939 was to ignore a circumstance that should have been obvious: national socialism grows out of revanchism and it cannot but look west. But fundamentally, the manifested tactical intellectual shortage goes considerably deeper. I will make a step back in time.

1917. A victorious socialist revolution in Russia begins. In 1987, on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Russian revolution, such leading British newspapers like the Times and the Guardian published copies of their front pages of November 1917. We can appreciate the splendid English sense of self-irony: the distance of time has revealed to a grotesque the wrongly attributed insignificance and the evaluations given at that time to an event of world-historical import.

The sequel, however, is even more instructive and not funny at all. In the 1912s and the 1930s there was not a single conception, liberal or conservative, explaining what had happened. There were harsh criticisms, categorical nonacceptance, rejection of communism, but we only find serious explanatory schemes in two authors – Karl Kautsky (Kautsky 1923; Kautsky 1929) and Leon Trotsky (Trotsky 1936). They are both, in one sense or another, insiders of the workers’ movement.

For outsiders, the Russian revolution comes out to be a book sealed by seven seals. In the 1920s-1930s, there is no attempt in liberal literature to see the newly arisen historic phenomenon both in the

middle run and in the long run historically. The emphasis is put on such factors as ‘German money’, ‘Bolshevik conspiracy’, ‘the personal qualities of Lenin and Trotsky’. If there is any philosophy, it amounts to saying that in fact Bolshevism and communism are transitory phenomena, some kind of deviation. In a sense this is also valid for the other great afterwar political phenomenon.

1922. The first Fascist government in Italy. And **1933** – the beginning of the national socialist revolution in Germany. Fascism is the second deviation after Bolshevism, it is characterized by a fierce anticommunist rhetoric and there is nothing more ‘natural’ but also more elementary than seeking for a causal link between the two phenomena. Even the most perspicacious of European politicians, Churchill, holds to this opinion that has become a trite pseudo-truth: ‘Fascism was the shadow or ugly child of communism’. (Churchill 1948: 13) At least one question arises: whose child is communism itself?

1945-1989. After World War II, finally a theoretical scheme was developed that explains both communism and fascism: the theory of totalitarianism. Its first test was the events after Stalin’s death. Hannah Arendt understood that the theory whose co-author she was ceases to work for the explanation of the events in the USSR and restricted its validity up to 1953. Of course, the question arises what other theory can encompass also the latest events. But the theory of totalitarianism was not abandoned but just edited, and it received an almost official status in the West. In the meantime in the mid-1980s in the USSR a process of *perestroika* began which obviously cannot be inscribed in within the borders of this theory. It is a theoretical nonsense to maintain that *glasnost* can be an official slogan and a real practice in a totalitarian state.

The intellectual shortage contained in the theory of totalitarianism has lead to the events of 1989 being a surprise to the West. Seymour Lipset – the only American scientist who was a president both of the American Sociological Association and of the American Political Science Association – summed it up as follows:

‘The main question that social scientists have to deal regarding the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union is: why they and, it must be admitted, nonacademical experts like the intelligence services of the great Western powers, did not anticipate not only that this would happen but even that it could happen.’ (Lipset 1994).

No answer was sought to this ‘main question’, rather, the question itself was brushed aside. Instead of admitting that the theory of totalitarianism, which puts fascism and communism under a common denominator, came out to be untenable, what began was its glorifying and turning it into an almost official doctrine in the former socialist countries. It came out that theoretical failure is no obstacle to political and informational triumph. And there is another extremely important circumstance that is related to this fact.

After 1989-1991. The transformation of the Eastern Bloc by and after the fall of ‘the Wall’ was unambiguously described as a military victory of the USA (the West, NATO) in the Cold War. The point of view of such a leading figure of that process as M. Gorbachev was entirely ignored, namely, the new thinking of Russia and the whole world. Misunderstanding Soviet Russia (in the liberalism-socialism stand-off) went to misunderstanding post-Soviet Russia (in imposing the new civilization matrix – the ‘conflict of civilizations’).

The West entered the new 21st century burdened by a series of intellectual shortages that prevent it to conceptualize adequately the new phenomena, and set in motion delayed reactions, and most often ones of force.

2001. We can date ‘supermodernity’ as of 2001. One often cites 1989 as a border year. Of course, the fall of the Wall is a key event but in a sense it is not a single act but a series of events: the dissolution of the Warsaw pact, the unification of Germany, the collapse and split-up of the USSR, the gentle divorce in Czechoslovakia, the bloody war in Yugoslavia, the NATO bombings... The 1990s are a period of transformation of real socialism that ended up with the secession of Milošević in 2000.

The destruction of the World Trade Center is a division point that elucidates a change in the structural factors and the proceeding of globalization. In the North-South stand-off, political Islam becomes a banner of resistance against globalization. The culmination point is the emergence of the Islamic State.

In the 1920s and 1930s communism and fascism emerged as a result of WW I. In the 21st century, Al Qaeda and Islamic State emerged after the end of the Cold War as a result of a crisis provoked by the progress of globalization. In both cases the new phenomena remained misunderstood.

In the case of the Islamic State there seem to be specific structural obstacles. It is a state because it collects taxes, it has

introduced a legal order – the Sharia, it has governing structures and a battleworthy army, an information service and an official ideological periodical, it even mints coins. And in the same time it is not a state in the traditional sense. Note the golden coin released into circulation: on one of its sides, there is the map of the whole world. Of course, we may remember the Comintern, but in this case the hubris has a different basis. To become a communist, you must walk a path in which you assimilate communist ideas. It is different with the Islamic State. It appeals to all Muslims – these are its potential subjects and they are all over the world.³⁾ And they already *are* Muslims. And here is the most subtle question: the problem lies in the attitude towards religion. To overstep the line, you need just one thing: embracing Islam as a way of life, taking it as a whole, by the letter.

The opinion is widespread, almost universal, that the main difference is between the theological content of Islam and Christianity. The antithesis is more precise: the most important lies in the attitude of Muslims and Christians towards theological content. The difference is between *reduced* Christianity and *authentic* Islam. The conflict is not civilizational but globalizational.

To seek for the root of the problem in Islam as it stands is a dangerous fallacy.

I will offer you a short text: ‘Every man who prays or prophesies with his head covered dishonours his head, and every woman who prays or prophesies with her head uncovered dishonours her head, since it is the same as if her head were shaven. [...] For man did not come from woman but woman came from man; and man was not made for woman but woman was made for man. That is why the woman must have on her head a symbol of her man’s power over her: because of the angels.’ Where is this? The Holy Quran? No! This is the Holy Bible, Saint Paul’s First Epistle to Corinthians.⁴⁾

3) According to expert estimates, at least 10-15% of the Muslims in the world are open to the ideas of radical Islam.

4) Other texts can also be quoted: ‘Think not that I am come to send peace on earth: I came not to send peace, but a sword.’ Imagine how often these words would have been quoted if they belonged to Mohamed. But they belong to Jesus Christ (Matthew 10:34). He also has: ‘Whoever is not with me is against me’ (Matthew 12:30). Of course Christianity is not only that, but Islam too is not an elementary religion. We should never forget: ‘For four or five centuries, Islam was the most brilliant civilization in the Old World’ (Braudel 1995: 73). In the Holy Quran we can read: ‘Allah wrongs not even the weight of a speck of dust, but if there is any good done, He doubles it and gives from Himself a great reward.’ (Surah An-Nisa, 40). Those who depict Allah with a Kalashnikov as a radical Islamist become accomplices of the terrorists.

The question is that with the passing of time, Christianity has irreversibly filtered the injunctions of its initial doctrines. A similar tendency is also present in Islam but it is far more incomplete. In this sense, belief in Islam falls into a different social time, and Salafism – the powerful doctrinal movement whose most eminent theoretician is Syed Qutb – is a requirement of reversibility, of return to the fundamentals of the faith (Qutb: 1981). I would say, a requirement of an authentically active, rather than opportunistically formal, attitude to the Faith.

In the slogan ‘Je suis Charlie’, categorical liberal self-assertion is entwined with a striking intellectual short-sightedness. This is the inability to comprehend that the freedom of speech in a social time is not the right to degrade the faith of millions of people who live in a different social time, and that brutal cartoons do not induce these millions of people to become contemporary, they push them back to be capsulated in the Middle Ages instead. The best service one can do to the extremists is to strengthen their link with the primordial faith of the millions of Muslims.

You cannot overcome radical Islam if you do not turn central attention to the idea. In different versions, this is repeated in diverse ways by Western experts and politicians, Cameron being the latest. Nevertheless, we see no progress. There is a general condition: a dialog is needed with the Islamic world but not from the positions of Euro-centrism and West-centrism.

West-centrism is becoming a specific form of intellectual shortage in the global world. Unfortunately, the attitude towards Islam is not the only example.

2014. The Ukrainian crisis. I will quote again a statement that is a point of vantage:

‘The Ukraine crisis is turning into a tragedy because it is confusing the long-range interests of global order with the immediate need of restoring Ukrainian identity.’ To develop the Ukrainian conflict, in the author’s perspective, it is absolutely necessary to see this conflict in the global and historical context. (Kissinger 2015)

The author is Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State and Nobel Peace Prize laureate. I will only add that according to the famous diplomat, the long-term interests of global order require the integration of Russia rather than its destruction.

There are different ‘floors’ of social interests. They can be own (regional, national, class) short-term, own strategic – middle-term or

long-term, they can be global, of the humankind or of the ‘world order’. The requirement is increasingly more important for them to synchronize, and their conflict is increasingly more dangerous, granted their leading role at the lower tier. It hardly needs stressing that confusing is a manifestation of self-interested short-sightedness.

2015. The migration crisis in the European Union. The wave of refugees that hit Europe shattered the foundations of the EU so deeply that even in the traditionally pro-Europe Bulgaria, according to GALLUP’s last poll, Euroskeptics are virtually equal with Eurooptimists: one-third of Bulgarians believe that the EU can collapse, one-third believe the opposite and one-third expressed no opinion. The migration blow seemed surprising, just like, indeed, most events that I just traced, starting from WWI. It wasn’t until May 2016 that the state leaders of G-7 defined migration as a global problem. However, one could hear exact prognoses decades earlier. In the mid-1990s Immanuel Wallerstein warned about the possible end of the simultaneous development of two disproportions – the demographic and the social – in the North-South relations.

‘This would imply that by 2025 or so, in North America, Western Europe and (even) Japan, the population socially defined as being of ‘Southern’ origin may well range from twenty-five to fifty percent, and much higher in certain subregions and within large urban centers.’ And after stating that there will be a correlation between occupying the lowest paid jobs and the absence of political and social rights, he continues: ‘It was this kind of situation Great Britain and France in the first half of the nineteenth century’ as described in classical Marxism. Finally he throws out an ironic question: “‘The second time as farce’?” (Wallerstein 2001: 358)

2. BASIS AND ESSENCE OF INTELLECTUAL SHORTAGE

Gnoseologically, intellectual shortage is due primarily to ignoring the *sociological wholeness* of the time-space continuum. The failure in Afghanistan is, cognitively, a disregard of the ‘sociological Afghanistan’. The Iraq adventure is not only the fruit of lie but also of an abstract vision focusing on the figure of Saddam Hussein and a certain facet of his regime, ignoring ‘the sociological Iraq’. Similarly, the Ukrainian Euromaidan began by absurdly neglecting ‘the sociological Ukraine’. And it is not Putin’s ‘impredictability’ but,

rather, sociological realities are what underlied the ensuing events in Donbass after the overthrow in February 2014. Migration is not just an aspect of the crisis in the Middle East and Northern Africa but an element of the sociological wholeness of the global world.

The other side of abstraction is social time. I mean both the structural time of *longue durée* processes and cyclic time with middle-run perspective.

Intellectual shortage is a characteristic of the public atmosphere and of governing decisions, not meaning an absence of personal insights but, on the contrary, highlighted by them. It is manifested in a methodological inability to explain new grand events.

Intellectual shortage is a component of *ideology* understood as 'false consciousness'. According to 'the Thinker of the millennium', the dominating thoughts in an epoch are those of the dominating class (Marx 2013). Intellectual shortage safeguards that domination. Cognitive flawlessness, adequacy, completeness involve relativity, conditionality, dynamics, taking into account historical processes and limits. These aspects become undesirable since they put 'dominating thoughts' under doubt. Hence the shortage.

3. RISKS AND CHANCES

After WWII Georg Lukacs, one of the greatest 20th c. philosophers, publishes a sharply critical book entitled *Die Zerschörung der Vernunft (The Destruction of Reason)*. This summary phrase has retained its force and expanded its importance in the 21st century.

In our everyday life we witness a rehabilitation of superstition and of everything that not only the Enlightenment but also the Christian religion called superstition: an invasion of mages, fortune-tellers, clairvoyants, numerologists, astrologists, psychics, commercial offers of white and black magic, information of diverse zodiacal systems have become an ordinary consumer good. There are organizations of Satan worshippers. Some observers speak of an antiscientific revolution.

Bernard Muntian saw the problem also in greater depth. The computer assists thinking but also replaces it. There was an analogous ambivalence with the coming of writing, acutely contested by Socrates. Today, thanks to the new contrivance, heuristics is replaced by copy-pasting.

At the highest theoretical level, postmodernism legitimates the multiplicity of truths, thereby opening wide the door and legitimating half-truths and pseudo-truths.

At the practical institutional level, the 'information era' comes out to be also an era of disinformation. On the basis of admitted lies, decisions were taken that cost the lives of hundreds of thousands. In the information system of global society, despite the officially declared pluralism, a one-sided perspective is systematically being imposed.

At the level of scientific politics: investment in fundamental sciences, especially social science, is increasingly more restricted, although increasingly more necessary.

To sum up, and most importantly: the distance between the challenges to humanity in the 21st century and the level of their conceptualization and resolving is rapidly widening. Global problems are well known: ecology, resources, demography, the social problem (the North-South polarization). It seems to be less known that there governing and intellectual prerequisites to meet the challenge. Let us remember the historian who turned the nowadays widely used word 'challenge' into a scientific category. According to Arnold Toynbee, every comes, in the course of its development, upon a challenge that the elite must meet; if it does so adequately, the civilization progresses; if not, it dies...

The specific is that today, the world civilization is at stake.

Globalization, which rapidly occurs in the world today, means expanding and thickening the system of social links. The scale of the horizontal entails the need of strengthening the vertical. Dissonance engenders chaos.

Two types of ways are possible: repressive and democratic.⁵⁾ The first means a strong world leader imposing its will. The second is achieving consensus first among the leading countries.

Both processes are going on. There is the openly declared claim of the USA to be the single world leader. There also are the formation of G-20 and international venues like the Climate Change Conference in Paris. The alternative is announced between a *one-pole world* and a *many-pole world*.

The USA National Security Strategy (as of February 2015)⁶⁾ proclaims the American global leadership motivated by American exceptionalism. It is planned, e.g., that the USA can take decisions of imposing sanctions or military action against other country even without the sanction of international organizations and even without the support of their own allies. Remember Kant's categorical imperative.

5) As established as early as in the 1990s by Immanuel Wallerstein.

6) USA National Security Strategy 2015.

American or any other exceptionality cannot be the basis of an international legal order. The very proclamation of such a doctrine – with a presidential introduction! – destroys the international legal order, replacing it by the right of force.⁷⁾ And this makes intellectual shortage deepen in two directions.

The one is internal politics. No other but George Friedman, an apologist of American leadership, wrote: ‘I am addressing my greatest concern, which is that the power of the United States in the world will undermine the republic.’⁸⁾

The foreign policy aspect is even more worrying.⁹⁾ The US doctrine plans to talk with China from the position of power and pushing Russia down. There also are apocalyptic scenarios. The Pentagon developed the conception of Prompt Global Strike, also quoted as pre-emptive surprise strike, and its applicability is discussed not only to North Korea but also to Russia. Supermodernity has its superblitzkrieg: a 60-minute war... We can remember that WWI began with the illusion that the war would be over by Christmas. And in WWII German soldiers had no winter outfits because the Blitz was supposed to end before the cold weather... With high precision non-nuclear arms, one hits the adversary’s strategic forces and paralyzes his communication; 60 minutes later one offers him unconditional capitulation, and if he refuses, ‘calling to reason’ (i.e. destruction of adversary population) begins with nuclear weapons. One detail is being overlooked: a single nuclear missile falling on the Yellowstone supervolcano would probably be enough to leave USA *and* the world civilization in ruins, the country firing the missile included...

The No.1 global problem is world peace.¹⁰⁾

7) ‘We will lead with all the instruments of U.S. power.’

8) Friedman 2011. And further: ‘I argue that the United States has become an empire not because it intended to, but because history has worked out that way. The issue of whether the United States should be an empire is meaningless. It is an empire.’ Henceforth we can remember the lessons of the history of Rome, the anti-utopia of the socialist Jack London *The Iron Heel* and the worries of the liberal Francis Fukuyama about *Our Posthuman Future*.

9) Kissinger’s warning in the interview: *‘Heilbrunn*: But we have witnessed a return, at least in Washington, DC, of neoconservatives and liberal hawks who are determined to break the back of the Russian government. *Kissinger*: Until they face the consequences. The trouble with America’s wars since the end of the Second World War has been the failure to relate strategy to what is possible domestically. The five wars we’ve fought since the end of World War II were all started with great enthusiasm. But the hawks did not prevail at the end’ (Kissinger 2014). Of course, this evaluation presupposes that no great war is going to happen.

10) The renowned German journalist Peter Scholl-Latour wrote that in the eve of 2014, ‘military confrontation on European territory looked impossible. Everyone was persuading everyone else that they have learned from the horrible lessons of the First World War. Today these illu-

In the 1990s, the transition from culture of violence to culture of peace was high on the agenda. Today, one debates a second Cold War.

Intellectual shortage is getting close to the red line beyond which madness begins.

George Friedman wrote in his political bestseller *The Next Decade. A Forecast for the 21st Century*:

‘But the United States is a young culture and as such it is clumsy, direct, at times brutal, and frequently torn by deep internal dissension—its dissidents being united only in the certainty that their values are best. The United States is all of these things, but as with Europe in the sixteenth century, the United States will, for all of its apparent bumbling, be remarkably effective.’ (Friedman 2009:30).

Friedman has splendidly described American hubris.¹¹⁾ He has only missed one detail: the five-centuries difference that separates the 21st from the 16th century. ‘Clumsiness’, ‘directness’, ‘brutality’, ‘bumbling’ and arrogance cannot provide long-term efficiency in our century. And this can be seen in political practice.

The USA are the country with the greatest economic, political and military potential in the contemporary world. And in the whole of history. Hence the greatest responsibility. And the possibility of global political initiative that would stop the growth of entropy in international relations and stabilize world peace.¹²⁾

In the last decade of the 20th century, the Cold War ended because Russia managed to overcome its own Stalinism. In the 21st century the chance to prevent a new and more dangerous Cold War depends most on whether or not the USA will be able to overcome their own *hubris*.

The strategy of the one-pole world legitimates the presumption that the historical limit of capitalism coincides with American hegemony. Historical processes tell us that this is not entirely the case.

sions are destroyed and we face a series of world conflicts that are shameless and disgraceful testimonies on the rulers. The old wounds that we deemed healed are open again.’ Scholl-Latour 2015: 7.)

- 11) ‘Hubris (Greek ὑβρις) means arrogance and conceit, lack of connection to reality, overstating one’s own position and insulting the gods which leads to consequent punishment and defeat’ (<https://bg.wikipedia.org/wiki/Хюбрис>).
- 12) The main idea in Zbigniew Brzezinski’s latest work *Strategic Vision. Toward a Global Realignment* (Brzezinski 2016) is that, in the forthcoming ‘global realignment’, the USA must initiate itself the formation of the new balance of power in taking into account first of all the relations in the triangle USA-Russia-China: As its era of global dominance ends, the United States needs to take the lead in realigning the global power architecture’.

A new, Eastern Asian, centre of world economic activity is being formed. Historically, moving the economic centre was accompanied by destructive military conflict.¹³⁾ Thus, beginning by a direct clash in the 18th century, New Amsterdam became New York.

Today it is the turn of ‘wars through intermediaries’.

‘Hybrid war’ is the confrontation of two or more sides in using a set of intermediaries: information media, paramilitary formations, someone else’s military forces, many-moves, diplomatically mediated, political combinations.

The so-called information war deserves special attention. It is the realization of the advantage of the USA and the West as a whole, but mostly of the USA. The responsibilities of ‘global players’ like Russia and China loses its real dimensions when using double standards. The same applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to such regional levels as the Middle East.

We can talk of a specific ‘informational imperialism’. In the historical context, this is a new phase after political imperialism (known as colonialism) and economic imperialism (known as neocolonialism). Information war is a protective measure for the safeguarding of intellectual shortage.

For the species of Homo Sapiens to survive, more is needed than compensating for one or another intellectual shortage. A typological change is necessary: a transition to supra-ideological thinking, to a thinking not conditioned by group and private interests – class interests, racial, national, regional, religious, ethnic... The riddle of history comes out to be the contradiction between universalism and particularism.

It is not certain that the step to a new type of thinking will be taken. But it is worth working for it.

13) Giovanni Arrighi, co-founder of the Fernand Braudel Center at the State University of New York at Binghamton, argues that the world economy, starting by the 17th c., passes through several cycles of accumulation of capital: Dutch (17th-18th cc.), British (19th – early 20th cc.) and American (20th-early 21st cc.). Currently we are entering a new Asian system cycle of capital accumulation. (See Arrighi 2007.)

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Петар-Емил Митев

ИНТЕЛЕКТУАЛНИ НЕДОСТАЦИ И КРИЗА СВЕТА КАПИТАЛИСТИЧКОГ СИСТЕМА

Резиме

Двоструки стандарди у међународној политици данашњице садрже свесно обмањивање али – у масовним случајевима – они постају прихватљиви јавном мњењу у развијеним земљама јер одговарају традиционалној и растуће неадекватној западноцентричној концепцији света. Да би се изашло из овакве привидне ситуације потребно је проширити границе маште и разумевања, тј. потребно је да се превазиђу одређени интелектуални недостаци.

Постмодернизам је на теоријском нивоу легитимисао многострукост истине, чиме су широко отворена врата полуистинама и псеудо-истинама. На практичном институционалном нивоу наступила је ера дезинформација. На основу лажи донете су многе битне одлуке које су коштале стотине хиљаде живота. На глобалном нивоу јавља се велики број проблема: еколошки, демографски, борба око ресурса, поларизација друштва на Север-Југ... Да би преживело човечанство, потребно је учинити много више од превазилажења интелектуалних недостатака. Потребна је једна коренита типолошка промена која ће довести до преласка на један тзв. супра-идеолошки начин размишљања који неће бити оптерећен групним и приватним интересима као што су – класни интереси, расни, национални, верски, религијски, етнички... Прави изазов историје огледа се у томе да је потребно бити између универзализма и партикуларизма. Још увек није извесно да ли ће и када такав корак бити учињен, али то свакако представља нешто за шта је вредно залагати се.

Кључне речи: интелектуални недостаци, капитализам, демократија, глобализација, јавно мњење, међународна политика¹⁴⁾

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